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A. Conditional Means Results
In this Appendix, we provide details of the conditional means results discussed in Section
II.C of the paper. For simplicity, we focus only on the demand and default equations, and
exclude consideration of loan use.
From equation 1 in the paper, we write the firm’s borrowing decision as a binary choice
between the outside good and the maximum utility it can receive from one of the Jmt inside
goods. That is, a firm i will borrow from a bank j in market m in year t if:
(A1) Max
j∈1,...,Jmt
{α¯D0 +X ′DjmtβD + ξDjmt + αDPijmt + Y ′DijmtηD + εDi + νijmt} ≥ νi0mt.
This can be rewritten as:
εDi ≥ νi0mt − α¯D0 − Max
j∈1,...,Jmt
{X ′DjmtβD + ξDjmt + αDPijmt + Y ′DijmtηD + νijmt}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ti
,
(A2)
where we can simplify the right-hand side, Ti, into a firm-specific component because each
firm i in the sample is active in a single market and single year and, once we take the
maximum, j drops out. That is, because unobserved demand for credit is firm- and not
bank-specific, the additional Type I Extreme Value errors, νijmt, do not complicate the
calculation of the relationship between εDi and ε
F
i . As far as adverse selection is concerned,
we are interested in whether or not a firm borrows at all, not from which bank it borrows.
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Given this structure, the results relied upon in the text are straightforward. Because εDi and
εFi are jointly normally distributed with variances σ
2
D and σ
2
F , and correlation coefficient,
ρDF , then
E(εDi |D = 1) = E(εDi |εDi ≥ Ti)
= σD
φ(Ti/σD)
1− Φ(Ti/σD) > 0,
(A3)
and
E(εFi |D = 1) = ρDF
φ(Ti/σD)
1− Φ(Ti/σD) ,(A4)
where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the PDF and CDF of the standard normal distribution.
B. Numerical Results
B1. Monte Carlo
In this Appendix, we construct a simple Monte Carlo to give intuition for how adverse
selection and competition can interact in lending markets. We simulate data for the case of
a monopolist bank offering a loan to i = 1, ..., I potential borrowers, who are observationally
equivalent to the bank and differ only in their unobserved demand for credit (εDi ) and their
utility from default, εFi , which we call their “riskiness”. For simplicity, we concentrate on
the correlation in the unobservables between demand and default (ρDF ), setting borrowers’
loan amount and loan use to 1.
In the Monte Carlo, we keep these data fixed and vary two parameters: borrowers’ price
sensitivity, α, as a proxy for the strength of the effects of a competitive fringe on the bank’s
residual demand curve,1 and the extent of asymmetric information, ρDF , where ρDF < 0
means advantageous selection and ρDF > 0 means adverse selection. For each of these
cases, we compute the bank’s equilibrium price based on the maximization of its expected
profit, as described in Section II.C in the paper.
Formally, let borrower i have utility UDi from taking credit from the bank, utility U
D
i0 from
not borrowing, and utility UFi from defaulting:
1 In this example, we capture competition versus the outside option, but have verified that increasing the number
of banks in the model gives the same qualitative results.
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(B1)
UDi = α¯0 + αP + ε
D
i + νi,
UDi0 = νi0,
UFi = ε
F
i ,
where P is the interest rate charged by the bank (common across borrowers since there
is no observed heterogeneity), and νi, νi0 are distributed as type 1 extreme value. We
allow εDi and ε
F
i to be jointly normally distributed, with correlation coefficient −1 ≤
ρDF ≤ 1, and set the variance of εDi to 4 and the variance of εFi to 1. Last, we set
α¯0 = 1. We assume that all borrowers have the same price sensitivity α < 0. Our
asymmetric information assumption implies that the bank doesn’t observe borrower i’s
individual demand and default unobservables, εDi and ε
F
i , but only their distribution in
the population of borrowers.
Given this setup, borrower i’s demand probability is:
PrDi = Pr(α¯0 + αP + ε
D
i + νi > νi0)
=
exp(α¯0 + αP + ε
D
i )
1 + exp(α¯0 + αP + εDi )
= Λ(α¯0 + αP + ε
D
i ),
(B2)
where Λ(·) is the CDF of the logistic distribution. Given PrDi , the bank’s expected market
share is Q =
∫
PrDi f(ε
D
i )dε
D
i , where f(ε
D
i ) is the density of ε
D
i . Conditional on demand
(D = 1), the default probability follows that implied by the joint normality assumption
(J. M. Wooldridge 2002) and is:
PrFi,F=1|D=1 = E
[
Pr(εFi > 0|εDi , P )|D = 1, P
]
=
∫
Φ
 ρDF εDiσ2√
1− ρ2DF
σ2
 f(εDi |D = 1)dεDi ,(B3)
where Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution, σ is the variance of εDi , and
f(εDi |D = 1) is the density of εDi conditional on borrowing. In this simple setting, the bank
faces no observable heterogeneity in borrowers’ default probability, so its expected share
of defaulters is just F = PrFi,F=1|D=1. Given these probabilities and our supply-side model
described in the paper, expected profit-maximization by the bank delivers the following
version of the pricing equation 6:
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(B4) P =
MC
1− F − F ′ 1α(1−Q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective Marginal Cost
+
−(1− F ) 1α(1−Q)
1− F − F ′ 1α(1−Q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective Markup
,
where F ′ is the derivative of the expected default rate with respect to price, and α(1−Q)
is the derivative of the expected market share with respect to price.
The top graph of Figure B1 reports effective marginal costs, the bottom graph of Figure
B1 reports the negative of effective markups, while Figure B2 combines these to show equi-
librium prices. The figures examine how these three elements vary with different degrees of
adverse selection, measured by ρDF , and “competition” with the outside option, measured
by the slope parameter of the monopolist’s residual demand curve, α.
Looking at the top graph in Figure B1, for a high level of competition (i.e. the rightmost
point on the top graph) an increase in adverse selection (moving to the northwest) causes
effective marginal costs to increase, whereas for low competition (the point closest to the
reader on the top graph, again moving northwest) it remains relatively constant. The
opposite happens for effective markups as we increase adverse selection. Looking at the
bottom graph of Figure B1, and recalling that it reports the negative of effective markups
(thus a higher markup is associated with a lower point in the graph), for high levels of com-
petition (the rightmost point on the bottom graph, moving to the northwest), increases in
adverse selection decrease effective markups slightly, whereas for low levels of competition,
(the closest point to the reader on the bottom graph, again moving northwest), increases
in adverse selection decrease effective markups substantially.
Figure B2 combines both factors and demonstrates a non-monotonic price response to
increases in adverse selection, with the sign of the effect depending on the level of competi-
tion. While equilibrium prices rise with adverse selection in a competitive environment (the
closest point to the reader, moving to the northeast), the opposite happens in a concen-
trated market (the leftmost point, moving east). In a competitive environment, markups
are low and the average borrower effect dominates, so increasing adverse selection causes
prices to rise (driven by the rising effective marginal costs shown in Figure B1). In a less
competitive environment, by contrast, markups are high, enhancing the marginal borrower
effect, and increasing adverse selection drives prices down. In competitive markets, banks
have small margins and can only increase prices in response to increased average selection,
while in less competitive markets, banks with higher markups find it profitable to reduce
prices as it allows them to attract relatively safe borrowers.
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Figure B1. Adverse Selection vs Imperfect Competition - Effective Marginal Costs, Negative Effective
Markups
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Note: The vertical axis shows the value of effective marginal costs and of the negative of the effective markups. The
left horizontal axis is level of adverse selection, increasing towards left. The right horizontal axis measures the slope
of the residual demand curve (our measure of competition with the outside option), increasing towards the right.
Figure B2. Adverse Selection vs Imperfect Competition - Equilibrium Prices
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Note: The vertical axis shows the level of equilibrium prices. The left horizontal axis measures the slope of the
residual demand curve (our measure of competition with the outside option), increasing towards the right. The right
horizontal axis is the level of adverse selection, increasing towards right. The horizontal axis definitions and scales
in this figure differ from those in Figure B1 to better display the effects in each.
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B2. ∂F ′/∂ρDF Results
For the simplified setting described in the Monte Carlo, equation (B3) above presented
the formula for the probability firm i defaults given that it has chosen to borrow, D = 1.
In what follows, we derive this formula and its derivatives in greater detail for use in the
discussion in Section II.C in the body of the text.
To understand where equation (B3) came from, note that given the structure of prefer-
ences described in equation (B1) and the joint normality assumption on εDi and ε
F
i , the
probability of default, F = 1, conditioned on a specific εDi is Φ
 ρDF εDiσ2√
1− ρ
2
DF
σ2
. When we
calculate the conditional probability of default, we therefore need to take into account that
borrowers have selected into the decision to borrow.
In a standard Heckman setting, the selection equation is deterministic: a firm borrows if
εDi ≥ α¯0 − αP . The problem in our case is different because our selection equation gives
only a probability of borrowing conditional on εDi rather than a deterministic threshold.
From equation (B2), we know that:
(B5) PrD
i|εDi = Λ(α0 + αP + ε
D
i ).
One can then apply Bayes rule to obtain the conditional distribution of εDi given D =
1:
f(εDi |D = 1) =
PrD
i|εDi
f(εDi )
PrDi
=
Λ(α0 + αP + ε
D
i )f(ε
D
i )∫
Λ(α0 + αP + εDi )f(ε
D
i )dε
D
i
.
(B6)
Then, the probability of default conditional on borrowing is just the expected value of
Φ
 ρDF εDiσ2√
1− ρ
2
DF
σ2
 under f(εDi |D = 1). As in equation (B3) above,
(B7) PrFi,F=1|D=1 =
∫
Φ
 ρDF εDiσ2√
1− ρ2DF
σ2
 f(εDi |D = 1)dεDi .
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Let Λ(α0 + αP + ε
D
i ) = Λ(.) to simplify the notation. Substituting equation (B6) into
equation (B7) we get:
(B8) PrFi,F=1|D=1 =
1∫
Λ(.)f(εDi )dε
D
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
∫
Φ
 ρDF εDiσ2√
1− ρ2DF
σ2
Λ(.)f(εDi )dεDi
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
.
The derivative of default conditional on borrowing with respect to P , that is F ′ijmt in
Section II.C, is given by:
(B9)
∂PrFi,F=1|D=1
∂P
=
∂A
∂P
B +A∂B
∂P
,
with the derivative components in this equation given by the following two terms:
∂A
∂P
= −α
∫
Λ(.)(1− Λ(.))f(εDi )dεDi(∫
Λ(.)f(εDi )dε
D
i
)2 ,
∂B
∂P
=
∫
Φ
 ρDF εDiσ2√
1− ρ2DF
σ2
αΛ(.) (1− Λ(.)) f(εDi )dεDi .(B10)
The second derivative of default conditional on borrowing with respect to P and ρDF ,
referred to in the body of the text as ∂F ′ijmt/∂ρDF , is given by:
(B11)
∂2PrFi,F=1|D=1
∂P∂ρDF
=
∂A
∂P
∂B
∂ρDF
+A ∂
2B
∂P∂ρDF
,
with the two new derivative components in this equation given by the following terms:
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Figure B3. ∂PrFi,F=1|D=1/∂P
∂B
∂ρDF
=
∫
φ
 ρDF εDiσ2√
1− ρ2DF
σ2
 εDiσ2(
1− ρ2DF
σ2
) 3
2
Λ(.)f(εDi )dε
D
i ,
∂2B
∂P∂ρDF
=
∫
φ
 ρDF εDiσ2√
1− ρ2DF
σ2
 εDiσ2(
1− ρ2DF
σ2
) 3
2
αΛ(.) (1− Λ(.)) f(εDi )dεDi ,
(B12)
where φ is the PDF of a standard normal distribution. Even in this simple setting, it is
difficult to sign these derivatives analytically. Instead, we simulate them for ρ ∈ [−1, 1],
α0 = 0, α = −1, and σ = 1 to obtain Figure B3. As can be seen there, the derivative of
the default probability with respect to price is the same sign as ρDF and the slope of this
line, measuring ∂2PrFi,F=1|D=1/∂P∂ρDF , is everywhere increasing when ρDF > 0.
C. Constructing the Dataset
We have assembled data from the following sources:
• Firm Data: Dataset from Centrale dei Bilanci with yearly (1988-1998) balance
sheet data for each firm, including data both for firms that take credit and those
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that do not. This data also includes the year of birth for each firm, its location at
the city council level, and what we call in Section I.B each firm’s “Score.” The Score
represents our measure of a firm’s observable default risk.
• Loan Data: Dataset from Centrale dei Rischi with yearly (1988-1998) firm-bank
loan contracts, including the amount of granted credit, the amount of this used by
the firm, the loan’s interest rate, and whether or not the firm has defaulted on this
loan (Section I.C in the paper describes our definition of default). As discussed in
Section I.A, this data is only available for 94 large banks (representing more than
80% of total bank lending) and for short term lines of credit.
• Bank Data: Dataset with yearly (1988-2002) balance sheet data for each bank,
including yearly total loans that each bank gives in each province, and its share of
the total loans granted in each province.
• Branch Data: Dataset with yearly (1959-2005) branches for the population (∼
1,500) of banks at the city council level.
• Coordinates Data: Based on the National Institute for Statistics ISTAT city coun-
cil classification, we assign to each city council the geographic coordinates that will
allow us to calculate firm-branch distances.
We first merge the firm data with the loan data, in order to combine all the borrowing
and non-borrowing firms. We then take all the banks actively lending in each province
and assume that those represent the choice set for each firm, regardless of whether they
have a branch in that province or not.2 We assume that each firm chooses one main credit
line from among those offered by the banks active in its province or chooses not to take
any line of credit (the outside good). The main line is defined as the line for which the
amount used, regardless of the amount granted, is the highest. For cases in which multiple
lines have the same amount used, then the one with the lowest price is defined as the main
line. We calculate the distance in kilometers between the city council of each firm and the
closest city council where each bank from the choice set has a branch using the geographic
coordinates.
D. Reduced Form Evidence
In this section we fully describe the reduced form evidence summarized in Section I.D in
the paper.
2 There is evidence in other papers (M. Bofondi and G. Gobbi 2006), as well as in our data, that a few banks
lend in some provinces even if they don’t have a branch there.
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Table D1—Reduced Form Evidence of Imperfect Competition
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log HHI Loans 0.02
(0.00)
Log HHI Firms 0.00
(0.00)
Log CR3 Loans 0.01
(0.01)
Log CR3 Firms 0.02
(0.00)
R2 0.923 0.923 0.923 0.923
N obs. 469,633 469,677 469,666 469,633
Note: The table shows the results of OLS regressions of the predicted interest rate (in percentage points) on lending
market concentration measures at the market-year level. An observation is a firm-bank-year. HHI Loans is the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on the share of credit. HHI Firms is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on
the share of firms. CR3 Loans is the concentration ratio for the 3 banks with the highest market share in terms of
loans in each market-year. CR3 Firms is the concentration ratio for the 3 banks with the highest market share in
terms of borrowers in each market-year. All regressions include bank-year fixed effects, bank-market fixed effects,
firm fixed effects, amount granted fixed effects and the distance between the firm and the bank. Standard errors are
clustered at the bank-year level.
D1. Imperfect Competition
In this subsection, we provide some descriptive evidence on imperfect competition in the
Italian market for small business lines of credit. We construct four alternative measures
of concentration and investigate their correlation with interest rates conditional on various
sets of observables. First, we calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of market
concentration based on each bank’s share of used credit within a market-year (hereafter HHI
Loans). Second, we define the same index based instead on each bank’s share of borrowers
within a market-year (HHI Firms). Third, we construct the 3-bank concentration ratio in
terms of used credit in each market-year (CR3 Loans). Finally, we construct the 3-bank
concentration ratio in terms of borrowers in each market-year (CR3 Firms). We then use
each of these as regressors in a regression of the log of predicted interest rates.3 We show in
Table D1 that concentration is positively correlated with interest rates in all specifications,
as expected, and is statistically significant for two out of the four measures we use. In
the first and fourth specifications, respectively in columns (1) and (4), we find that a 10%
increase in concentration is associated with a 0.2% increase in interest rates.
3 We use predicted interest rates because it’s the price variable we use in our structural demand model. See
Section III.A for a detailed description on how we construct predicted interest rates.
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D2. Asymmetric Information
In this subsection, we conduct reduced-form tests for the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation. To do so, we follow the early empirical literature on positive correlation tests
introduced by P. A. Chiappori and B. Salanie´ (2000). We propose two tests, one based on
the choice to take up a line of credit and another based on the choice of how much credit
to draw on that line. Both tests are based on the correlation between the unobservables
driving these choices and the unobservables influencing default. The choice of these tests
gives a flavor of the identification strategy that we rely on in the structural model, as
explained in greater detail in Section III.C in the body of the text.
Demand and Default: We start by investigating whether firms that are more likely to
demand credit are also more likely to default. Our data include both firms that borrow
and those that do not, while we only observe default on loans for borrowing firms. We can
formalize this problem as a selection model with two equations:
(D1)
di = 1(X
d
i β + νi > 0),
fi =
{
Xfi γ + ηi if di = 1
− if di = 0,
where di is equal to one if the firm borrows and fi is equal to one if the borrower defaults.
fi is observed only if di = 1. This is similar to the classical selection model analyzed
by J. J. Heckman (1979), where we interpret as adverse selection a positive correlation
between νi and ηi.
4 Results of this Heckman selection model are reported in the first two
columns (“Extensive Margin”) of Table D2, where the decisions to borrow and default
are regressed on year, market, firms’ Score, amount of granted credit, and sector fixed
effects, as well as on a set of firms’ balance sheet variables. We use as an instrument in
the selection (i.e. borrowing) equation the number of banks in a firm’s market, which we
interpret as a proxy for the competitiveness of banks’ local markets.5 We find a positive
and significant correlation coefficient of 0.09 between the unobservables driving demand
and default, which we interpret as preliminary evidence of asymmetric information on the
extensive margin.
Loan Use and Default: We then consider the relationship between loan use and default.
Unlike the previous test, we are not in a selection framework as the same firms are observed
in both equations. Still, the idea is the same, as we test for a positive correlation between
the unobservables that determine the choice of “extent of coverage” (loan use) and the
occurrence of an “accident” (default), conditional on several firm characteristics. Following
4 We estimate default as a linear probability model for ease of interpretation, but estimates from a discrete choice
regression yield similar results.
5 This is likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction that it influences demand for credit (via interest rates), but is
uncorrelated with a firm’s idiosyncratic decision to default. We find a first stage F-statistic of 75.94.
12 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
the intuition of the previous test, adverse selection should imply that riskier firms use more
credit. We set up the following seemingly unrelated regression (SUR):
(D2)
`i = Xiβ + εi,
fi = Xiγ + ηi,
where `i is the amount of its loan used by firm i, and, as before, fi takes value of one if
the borrower defaults. The vector of controls Xi is composed of year, market, bank, firms’
Score, amount of granted credit, and sector fixed effects, as well as on a set of firms’ balance
sheet variables. We specify the distribution of the residuals εi, ηi as joint normal, with a
correlation coefficient ρ. A positive and significant estimate of ρ suggests the presence of
asymmetric information. The results of this test are summarized in the last two columns
(“Intensive Margin”) of Table D2. We again find a positive correlation, consistent with
asymmetric information on the intensive margin.
E. Matching Model
As discussed in Section III.A, we must predict the prices charged on loans from banks from
whom firms chose not to borrow. We also need to predict both prices and the amount
of granted credit a firm that chooses not to borrow at all would require should it have
chosen to borrow. As summarized in Section III.A, we use propensity score matching to
estimate the prices and amounts of granted credit for non-borrowing firms. This subsection
describes how we do so.
Following G. W. Imbens (2004), G. W. Imbens and D. Rubin (2015), and M. Caliendo and
S. Kopeinig (2008), we construct an iterative process to appropriately select the relevant
variables determining the propensity score and obtain the best possible match. Our choice
of covariates for the matching, that is the variables determining whether a firm borrows or
not, is guided by economic theory and knowledge of the institutional setting, as well as by
the overlap in variables’ distributions and statistics from the matching results.
The final set of variables that we use are all fixed effects and include fixed effects for the year,
firms’ Score, firms’ geographical area, sales, and assets. In line with Caliendo and Kopeinig
(2008), we apply the following specific criteria in our selection in order to determine both
which variables to include and the degree of discretization for the fixed effects. First,
we only include controls that influence simultaneously the participation (borrowing vs
non-borrowing) and the outcome variables (interest rates or amount of granted credit,
depending on the variable we are predicting). Second, variables must be unaffected by
participation, or the anticipation of it, so should be either fixed over time or measured
before participation. The Score respects this rule, and we assume that the value of assets
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Table D2—Reduced Form Evidence for Adverse Selection
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
Variables Demand Default Loan Use Default
Correlation between Unobservables 0.09 0.03
(0.01) (0.00)
Total Assets 0.55 0.00 0.34 0.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Intangible Assets -0.95 -0.04 -0.39 -0.03
(0.07) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01)
Intangible/Total Assets -0.39 0.01 -0.08 0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01)
Sales 0.46 -0.00 -0.05 -0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Profits 0.53 0.02 0.48 0.01
(0.05) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01)
Cash Flow -0.43 -0.03 -2.29 -0.02
(0.07) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01)
Trade Debit -0.17 0.00 -0.08 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Firm’s Age 0.54 0.01 -0.07 0.01
(0.07) (0.01) (0.17) (0.01)
Number of Banks in Market 0.04 - -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Distance to Branch - - -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Interest Rate - - -0.02 0.00
(0.01) (0.00)
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Score FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Granted FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.222 0.091 0.437 0.094
N Obs. 36,520 25,351 25,351 25,351
Note: The table shows the results of a Heckman selection model for Demand and Default (Extensive Margin) and of
a SUR model for Loan Use and Default (Intensive Margin). The dependent variable is a dummy for credit demand
in Column 1, a dummy for default in column 2 and 4, and the amount of credit used in column 3. See Table 1 for
variables’ definition. The excluded instrument for the selection model is the number of banks in a firm’s market. In
each regression an observation is a firm. We rescale some variables to interpret the coefficients more easily: Intangible
Assets, Sales, Total Assets, Profits, and Cashflow are in e100,000. Trade Debit is in e1,000,000. Age of Firm is in
100 years.
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and sales are persistent over time. We choose to only control for a Score above or below 6,
as G. Rodano, N. Serrano-Velarde and E. Tarantino (2015) showed that this is the most
relevant threshold level for lending standards. Third, for the common support assumption
to hold, some randomness is needed, so some firms with identical characteristics should be
observed in each state (borrowing versus not). For this reason, we choose a parsimonious
set of variables and seek to avoid over-parametrization.
We summarize in Table E1 the normalized differences in means between treatment (non-
borrowers) and control (borrowers) groups.6 Imbens (2004) defines as “modest” normalized
differences below 0.3 in absolute value, and all of our differences for the continuous variables
used are below that threshold. We implement several matching methods and find similar
results across them. We choose to focus on k-nearest neighbor matching, as it allows us to
assign several untreated (borrowing) firms to each treated (non-borrowing) one.
We follow the standard literature in performing several statistical tests to assess the quality
of the matching. Variable selection is based on statistical significance, the “hit or miss”
method (J. J. Heckman, H. Ichimura and P. E. Todd 1997),7 and comparisons of several
statistics before and after the matching. These include the Pseudo-R-squared, the Likeli-
hood Ratio, the mean and median bias, and Rubin’s B and R.8 Caliendo and Kopeinig
(2008) explain that a rule of thumb for a good match is to have mean and median biases
below 3% to 5%. According to E. Leuven and B. Sianesi (2003), Rubin’s B should be
below 25% and Rubin’s R should be between 0.5 and 2. Finally, a good matching outcome
should deliver Pseudo R-squared and Likelihood Ratio tests high in the unmatched case,
and very low in the matched case. Our results pass all these statistical tests, as shown
in Tables E2 and E3. Last, we show a graph of the bias reduction and test the common
support of the propensity score between treated and untreated in Figure E1. Even though
there is a large mass at each tail, these figures show that the values for both groups span
the full range of propensity scores, implying that we have enough overlap as long as we
allow for replacement.
6 The normalized difference for a variable with mean µ and variance σ2 is given by µT−µC√
σ2
T
+σ2
C
/2
, where T stands
for treated (non-borrowing) and C stands for control (borrowing) groups.
7 Variables are chosen to maximize within-sample prediction rates, i.e. maximizing the cases in which the
estimated propensity score for each observation is greater than the sample proportion of firms taking the treatment
(in our case not borrowing).
8 B is the number of standard deviations between the means of the groups, and R is the ratio of treatment
variance to control variance (D. B. Rubin 2001).
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Table E1—Normalized Differences
Variable Obs Normalized Difference
Score 52,310 -0.294
Sales 52,310 -0.076
Total Assets 52,310 -0.066
Table E2—Matching Results 1
Unmatched Mean % Bias t-Test
Variable vs. Matched Treated Control % Bias Reduction t p > |t|
1991-1992 U 0.392 0.132 -33.6 -32.57 0.000
M 0.392 0.392 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000
1993-1994 U 0.333 0.308 5.6 5.90 0.000
M 0.333 0.333 0.0 100.0 -0.00 1.000
1995-1996 U 0.249 0.110 37.1 41.82 0.000
M 0.249 0.249 0.0 99.9 0.03 0.980
1997-1998 U 0.309 0.245 14.2 15.25 0.000
M 0.309 0.309 -0.0 99.8 -0.02 0.981
Score>6 U 0.281 0.358 -16.5 -17.24 0.000
M 0.281 0.281 0.0 100.0 -0.00 1.000
North Area U 0.656 0.662 -1.3 -1.35 0.176
M 0.656 0.656 0.0 100.0 -0.00 1.000
Sales Category 2 U 0.391 0.114 67.3 77.37 0.000
M 0.391 0.391 0.0 100.0 -0.00 1.000
Sales Category 3 U 0.135 0.229 -24.7 -25.17 0.000
M 0.135 0.135 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000
Sales Category 4 U 0.055 0.265 -59.8 -57.30 0.000
M 0.055 0.055 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000
Sales Category 5 U 0.056 0.265 -59.3 -56.92 0.000
M 0.056 0.056 0.0 100.0 -0.00 1.000
Assets Category 2 U 0.275 0.166 26.3 28.85 0.000
M 0.275 0.275 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000
Assets Category 3 U 0.132 0.231 -25.9 -26.36 0.000
M 0.132 0.132 0.0 100.0 -0.00 1.000
Assets Category 4 U 0.079 0.255 -48.6 -47.59 0.000
M 0.079 0.079 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000
Assets Category 5 U 0.061 0.263 -57.0 -54.94 0.000
M 0.061 0.061 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000
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Table E3—Matching Results 2
Sample Pseudo-R2 LR χ2 p > χ2 Mean Bias Median Bias Rubin’s B Rubin’s R
Unmatched 0.367 23,790.6 0.000 34.1 30.0 170.0 1.26
Matched -0.000 -0.00 1.000 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.00
Note: A rule of thumb for a good match is to have mean and median biases below 3% to 5%, Rubin’s B below 25%
and Rubin’s R between 0.5 and 2.
Figure E1. Matching Graph and Common Support
−50 0 50 100
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
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F. The Effects of Measurement Error in Predicted Prices
As discussed in footnotes 21 (in Section III.A), 28 (in Section III.A), and 31 (in Section
III.B), we assume that our model of price prediction does not induce conventional econo-
metric measurement error problems. In this section, we demonstrate that as long as the
residuals in the pricing regression are uncorrelated with default unobservables, any mea-
surement error due to our use of predicted prices can at most result in a conservative
estimate of the degree of adverse selection.
To do so, we outline a stylized version of our structural model to investigate the potential
direction of the bias due to measurement error in prices in the correlation coefficients that
identify adverse selection, our main coefficients of interest. We define firm i’s utility from
demanding (superscript D) from bank j, and its utility from defaulting (superscript F ),
to depend only on price and unobservables. We decompose prices into what we can and
cannot predict as follows:
(F1) Pij = P˜ij + τ˜ij ,
where Pij is the true price, P˜ij is the predicted price, and τ˜ij is the measurement error.
We identify adverse selection as a positive correlation between the unobservables of the
demand and default equations, εDi and ε
F
i :
(F2) UDij = α
DPij + ε
D
i ,
(F3) UFij = α
FPij + ε
F
i .
As described at length in Section III.A, our preferred model of price prediction uses data on
all the loans taken by each firm, allowing us to include firm fixed effects in its estimation.
The fourth column of Table 2 shows that this significantly increases the fit of the regression
(as measured by its R2) and the fourth column of Table 3 shows that the residuals from
this pricing regression are uncorrelated with default. In this stylized model, we therefore
claim that the measurement error, τ˜ij , is uncorrelated with ε
F
i .
Recall also that in our structural model, we only use predicted prices in the demand
estimation and not in the estimation of the loan use and default equations. In this stylized
model, this means we only need to account for measurement error in equation (F2) and
not equation (F3). Substituting (F1) in (F2), we get:
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(F4) UDij = α
D(P˜ij + τ˜ij) + ε
D
i = α
DP˜ij + ζij ,
where ζij ≡ αD τ˜ij + εDi . The true correlation coefficient between the propensity to borrow
and to default is defined by:
(F5) ρDF =
cov(εDi , ε
F
i )
σεDi
σεFi
.
In the presence of measurement error, we would estimate:
(F6) ρ˜DF =
cov(ζij , ε
F
i )
σζijσεFi
=
cov(εDi , ε
F
i )
(σεDi
+ αDστ˜ij )σεFi
= ρDF
σεDi
σεDi
+ αDστ˜ij
,
where the second equality follows from the assumed lack of correlation between τ˜ij and ε
F
i .
One can see that the only effect of measurement error in (F6) is the additional variance in
the composite demand error caused by the measurement error.
Equation (F6) shows that, typical of classical measurement error problems, in the presence
of measurement error our estimate of ρDF would be biased towards zero. The size of
any bias would depend on both αD and the standard deviation of τ˜ij relative to that of
εDi , that is, the firm’s private information. We believe that our price prediction reduces
measurement error to a minimum. Indeed, as we argue in the text, firms too are likely to
predict banks’ prices, rather than getting a price quotation from each of them, suggesting
thei variance of the demand error (which we normalize in the text to that of the standard
Type I Extreme Value) using our predicted prices should be comparable to that of firms.
Even if this weren’t the case, equation (F6) shows that the degree of adverse selection we
estimate is a lower bound on the true degree of adverse selection. Measurement error by
itself, therefore, cannot explain the correlation we find between the propensity to demand
credit and to default.
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G. Additional Tables and Figures
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Table G1—IV First Stage and OLS vs IV Second Stage for Demand
First Stage Second Stage
Variable Interest Rate OLS IV
Number Accounts 2nd quintile 0.05 - -
(0.01)
Number Accounts 3rd quintile 0.07 - -
(0.01)
Number Accounts 4th quintile 0.03 - -
(0.01)
Number Accounts 5th quintile 0.02 - -
(0.01)
Deposit Rate 2nd quintile 0.05 - -
(0.01)
Deposit Rate 3rd quintile 0.08 - -
(0.01)
Deposit Rate 4th quintile 0.08 - -
(0.02)
Deposit Rate 5th quintile 0.11 - -
(0.02)
Log of Deposit Amount -0.06 - -
(0.03)
Interest Rate - 0.16 -1.45
(0.22) (0.62)
Number of Branches 0.00 4.37 4.38
(0.02) (0.21) (0.21)
Share of Branches 0.00 0.53 0.53
(0.00) (0.05) (0.05)
Years in Market 0.03 0.01 0.06
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03)
Constant 0.95 -3.05 -4.14
(0.46) (0.24) (3.66)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs 6,036 6,036 6,036
R2 0.670 0.766 0.766
F-Stat 25.67 - -
Note: Standard errors in brackets. See Table 1 for variables’ definition. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-year
level.
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Table G2—IV First Stage for Loan Use and Default
First Stage
Variable Interest Rate
Interest Rates in Other Markets 0.56
(0.04)
Constant 8.37
(3.14)
Firm Controls Yes
Bank Controls Yes
Score FE Yes
Sector FE Yes
Loan Amount FE Yes
Bank FE Yes
Market-Year FE Yes
Obs 35,173
R2 0.376
F-Stat 184.24
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Firm and bank controls include respectively all the firm level and bank level
controls in Table 4. Standard errors are clustered at the market-year level.
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Table G3—Structural Estimates with Random Coefficient on Prices
Variables Demand Loan Use Default
Price
{
Interest Rate -1.40 -0.03 0.92
(0.62) (0.00) (0.02)
Assets

Total Assets 5.68 0.09 -0.03
(0.08) (0.00) (0.03)
Intangible/Total Assets -0.79 -0.01 0.09
(0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
Profitability

Profits 1.08 0.01 0.03
(0.05) (0.00) (0.02)
Firm Level Cash Flow -0.92 -0.05 -0.12
(0.05) (0.00) (0.02)
Sales 6.97 -0.01 -0.36
(0.07) (0.00) (0.04)
Debt
{
Trade Debit -3.34 -0.04 0.12
(0.05) (0.00) (0.02)
Others

Firm’s Age 0.22 0.00 0.02
(0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
Distance to Branch -1.24 -0.01 -0.04
(0.03) (0.01) (0.06)
Number of Branches 4.35 0.01 0.02
(0.15) (0.00) (0.02)
Bank Level Share of Branches 0.53 -0.07 -0.22
(0.04) (0.01) (0.10)
Years in Market 0.06 0.01 -0.10
(0.03) (0.00) (0.02)
Score Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes
First-stage fixed effects Loan Amount Yes Yes Yes
Bank-Market-Year Yes No No
Bank No Yes Yes
Market-Year No Yes Yes
Observations 506,230 25,351 25,351
Covariance matrix (Σ)

σD = 0.19
(0.00)
ρDL = 0.04 σL = 0.30
(0.00) (0.00)
Adverse Selection
ρDF = 0.09 ρLF = 0.09 σF = 1
(0.00) (0.00)
Note: All coefficients are estimated in the first stage, with the exception of the Interest Rate, the Number of Branches,
the Share of Branches and the Years in Market for the demand equation, that are estimated in the second stage.
Second stage fixed effects, only for the demand equation, are at the bank, market and year level. See Table 1 for
variables’ definition. Standard errors are in brackets. First stage standard errors are calculated by the inverse of
the Information matrix, obtained providing the solver with analytical gradient and hessian. Second stage standard
errors are computed with 200 bootstrap replications.
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Figure G1. Default Probability Distribution for Baseline Scenario and for Higher Adverse Selection
Counterfactual Scenario
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Table G4—Regressions of Counterfactual Outcomes’ Changes on Markups for Higher Adverse Selec-
tion and Higher Marginal Costs
Variables ∆Pijmt ∆Q
D
ijmt ∆Q
L
ijmt ∆Fijmt
Higher Adverse Selection
Effective Markup -0.25 0.14 0.02 -0.12
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.07)
Bank-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.763 0.787 0.125 0.896
N obs. 434,490 418,667 434,490 421,407
Higher Marginal Costs
Effective Markup -0.30 0.21 0.01 -0.27
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Bank-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.750 0.682 0.130 0.830
N obs. 434,490 418,740 434,490 420,122
Note: An observation is a firm-bank-market-year. Price, demand probabilities, and loan use changes are measured
in percentages. Default changes are measured in percentage points. See footnote 45 in the paper for dependent
variables’ definition. Effective Markup is constructed as the negative of the second term on the right hand side of
equation (6). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Note that we omit the top 3 percentiles of the markup
distribution, to avoid our results being driven by outliers. Given the presence of outliers also in the demand and
default percentage variations, we omit the top 3 percentiles from those distributions as well.
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